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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SITAMIPA ULISIS TOKI,

CaseNo.20090383-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant Sitamipa Toki was convicted of Discharging a Firearm from a Vehicle
or in the Direction of a Person, Building or Vehicle, with an in concert enhancement, a
second degree felony, and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a
second degree felony. R. 167. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A. This Court
has jurisdiction over pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2) (e) (Supp. 2009).
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
The text of the following statutes, rules, and constitutional provisions is in
Addendum B:
Rules 401, 402, 403, 404, Utah Rules of Evidence
Due Process Clause, Amend. XIV.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED, PRESERVATION, AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Issue I. Whether the trial court's error in repeatedly informing the jury that Toki
was charged with being a restricted person requires a new trial.
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness. See generally Weiser v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2010 UT 4, |16, ~P.3d-(questions of law are reviewed for correctness); In re IK., 2009 UT 70, ^|7, 220 P.3d 464
("Constitutional issues, including questions regarding due process, are questions of law
that we review for correctness.") (further citation omitted).
Preservation. This issue was preserved by Toki's motion to sever the restricted
person charge from the other charges (R. 53) and by the subsequent discussion alerting
the court that it needed to remove any reference to the restricted person charge from its
instructions. R. 227:663-64. Additionally, even if the issue had not been preserved, the
claim can be reviewed for plain error because the error was obvious and unduly
prejudicial under existing case law. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah
1993) (outlining plain error doctrine).
Issue II. Whether failing to question the jurors to detect juror bias following a
brawl in the hall outside the courtroom requires a new trial.
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness. See In re IK., 2009 UT 70, \1 (reviewing questions regarding due process
for correctness).
Preservation. This issue was preserved. R. 226:385.
Issue HI Whether testimony from a "gang expert" indicating that Toki was a

member of a dangerous gang involved in criminal activity was irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial, making it inadmissible under Utah's Rules of Evidence.
Standard of Review. Although evidentiary issues are reviewed for an abuse of
discretion (State v. Althoff, 2006 UT 48,1J4, 147 P.3d 1187), the trial court's "selection,
interpretation, and application" of any particular rule of evidence is reviewed for
correctness. Dalebout v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 1999 UT App 151, Tf20, 980 P.2d 1194
(citation omitted); State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, f4, 144 P.3d 1096.
Preservation. This issue was preserved by repeated objections below. R. 225:914; 226:523. Regardless, it can be reviewed for plain error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208.
Issue IV. Whether the cumulative effect of the errors in informing the jury that
Toki was charged with being a restricted person, failing to question the jurors to detect
bias following a melee outside the courtroom, and allowing testimony from a "gang
expert" indicating that Toki was a member of a dangerous gang involved in criminal
activity requires a new trial.
Standard of Review/Preservation. This issue relates to the reversal standard used
by an appellate court and therefore need not be preserved and involves a question of law.
See State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987) (discussing cumulative error doctrine).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state filed an Information dated February 12, 2007, charging Appellant
Sitamipa Toki with three counts: Discharging a Firearm in the Direction of a Building, a
second degree felony, Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted Person, a second degree
felony, and Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony. R. 1-2. The state amended that

Information on March 1, 2007, charging David Kamoto and Daniel Maumau as codefendants, and again amended the Information on October 3, 2008. R. 5-7; 109-110.
Following bindover on all counts, the state gave notice that it intended to present
expert testimony from Detective Break Merino regarding "gang recognition, behavior,
membership, and conflicts related to the Tongan Crip Gang." R. 39. Toki moved to
sever the charge of Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted Person from the other
charges. R. 53. He also filed a Notice of Alibi, indicating that the alibi witnesses would
testify that Appellant was at a birthday party "throughout the evening until morning" on
the date of the crimes charged in this case. R. 68.
A jury trial commenced on October 1, 2008. R. 75. Following a three day trial,
the jury convicted Toki of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person and
Discharge of a Weapon with a group enhancement, and acquitted on the Aggravated
Assault charge, finding a lesser offense. R. 112. The jury acquitted co-defendant
Kamoto. R. 113. The trial court sentenced Toki to two sentences of one to fifteen years
in prison, to be served consecutively. R. 167-68. Toki filed a timely motion for new
trial, and the trial court held a hearing on that motion on April 20, 2009. R. 169-70, 201.
After the trial court denied Toki's motion for new trial (R. 202-07), Toki filed a timely
notice of appeal. R. 208.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 3, 2007, several of the state's witnesses were having a family party at
a house in Kearns. R. 225:153. Myla, her niece Camilla, her nephew Magic, her friend
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Patty, and other family members were drinking heavily under a carport that had been
enclosed on all sides by a blue tarp. R. 225:154.
Myla's Testimony.
Myla had been drinking a lot. R. 225:156. At some point, Mele (also called
Mary) left with Patty's car to buy cigarettes. R. 225:156-57. She did not return and
Myla's nephew later called to say that Patty's car was parked up the street from his
house. R. 225:156-57. At about 5:30 or 6:00 a.m., Myla, Magic, and Camilla drove to
where Patty's car was parked. R. 225:157. The car was bouncing up and down, and
Myla suspected Mary might be inside "hooking up with some guy." R. 225:158. Myla
tapped on the window and opened the front driver's side door to let Mary know that Patty
wanted her car back. R. 225:158.
Myla looked in the car and saw Mele in the car with a man whom she was unable
to initially identify, but whom she later identified as Toki. R. 225:19, 173. Magic,
Mele's brother, opened the back passenger door and punched Toki. R. 225:160-61.
Myla, Magic, and Camilla then left. R. 225:161.
Mele called Myla a couple times, indicating she and Toki wanted to come and talk
to Magic. R. 225:162. Myla responded that she did not want them to come over because
of the earlier fight. R. 225:162. But at one point, Myla indicated that she had spoken to
Toki and told him to come over, then changed her mind but could not reach him. R.
225:163.
According to Myla, Mele and Toki later pulled into the driveway; Toki got out of
the car and said he wanted to talk with Magic but Myla said "no." R. 225:163. Myla said
5

Toki pulled out a rifle and told her to get out of the way, but did not threaten her with the
gun. R. 225:164, 176. She testified that Toki then fired the gun from outside the tarp,
and shot through the tarp into the ceiling of the carport but he did not enter the carport.
R. 225:175-76.
Myla also testified there were "two other guys" with long hair who were wearing
bandanas and holding guns; they approached along the driveway. R. 225:166, 168. Myla
did not recognize them and was unable to identify them. R. 225:167, 186. She did not
see them shoot the guns and did not hear any gunshots subsequent to the first gunshot that
she claimed Toki fired. R. 225:168. Myla went inside the tarp and did not see Toki or
the other individuals leave. R. 225:168. Myla has since corresponded with Toki, and
indicated that things from that night were a blur. R. 225:190-91.
Camilla's Testimony.
Camilla also acknowledged drinking heavily at the party, admitting that she
consumed close to a hundred ounces of beer. R. 226:242. She and Myla tried to call
Mele, who had taken Patty's car, but Mele ignored the calls. R. 225:204-05. After
learning where Patty's car was parked, Camilla, Myla and Magic drove to go get the car.
R. 225:206. The windows of the car were fogged up and the car was bouncing. R.
225:207-08. Camilla said she was the one who opened the door to the car and that she
saw Toki inside. R. 225:208. She claimed she did not see how Magic responded, but she
did see Toki emerge from the car with a snow scraper, challenging Magic to fight. R.
225:209-11. But at the preliminary hearing she testified that she saw Magic hit Toki
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then saw a leg emerge from the car and kick Magic, but did not mention Toki exiting
from the car with a snow scraper or challenging Magic to a fight. R. 226:263-65.
Camilla, Magic and Myla returned to the carport. R. 225:212. The lighting was
dim and Myla kept leaving to take phone calls. R. 226:214-15, 254. They were out of
alcohol but went to a gas station at 7:00 a.m. and bought more beer. R. 225:215. Camilla
subsequently heard Myla scream, "Magic, he has a gun." R. 225:216. Camilla and Magic
looked out the opening in the tarp but did not see anything. R. 225:216-17. After
bumping heads with Magic, Camilla saw Myla inside the tarp with her back toward them,
and Toki moving inside the tarp with the tarp resting on his back. R. 225:218, 256-57.
Camilla said that Toki told Myla to move, and after Myla ducked, he fired toward the
ceiling. R. 225:218. Debris from the ceiling hit Camilla and Magic in the face; Magic
pulled her to the ground and she tried to cover him. R. 225:218-20. When they looked
up, Toki was gone. R. 225:220.
Camilla tried to restrain Magic from going outside to fight. R. 225:224. Camilla
heard two more gunshots toward the front of the house, but they were not as loud as the
shotgun. R. 225:224-25. She did not see any of the other alleged shooters. R. 226:259.
When the police arrived, Camilla, Magic, and Myla came out from behind the tarp.
R.225:226. Mele, who was drunk, was near Patty's car and trying to leave when the
police arrived. R. 225:227; 226:239, 258.
Magic's Testimony.
Magic, Mele's brother, testified that the hole in the tarp that officers thought was
caused by the shotgun blast was already there. R. 226:301-02. He acknowledged that he
7

drank about ten beers before going to get Patty's car. R. 226:299, 303. When he arrived
at the car, he opened the door and saw Mele without any clothes on and Toki with no
shirt and trying to pull up his pants. R. 226:304. Magic hit Toki in the face because
"[w]ell, he's with my sister . . ." and claimed that Toki retaliated by kicking him. R.
226:304, 305, 322, 323. Magic also said that Toki had a snow scraper and challenged
him to fight. R.226:307. Myla and Camilla then screamed for him to get in their car, he
did, and they returned to the house in Kearns. R. 226:305, 307
About an hour and a half later, Magic was in the carport and heard his aunt Myla
say, "Magic, Magic, he has a gun." R. 226:308. After Magic and Camilla tackled each
other to the ground, Magic opened the tarp with Myla right in front of him. R. 226:308.
He said that Toki then shot at the ceiling. R. 226:308, 312. Magic said he heard five to
seven gunshots but did not see who fired them. R. 226:314-15. After the gunshots
ended, Magic tried to go after the shooters with a knife, but Mele and Myla stopped him.
R. 226:315. Magic did not leave the carport until officers arrived. R. 226:315-16. He
saw Mele lying in the middle of the street, but testified that he did not want to talk to her.
R. 226:316. On cross, he admitted that he approached Mele and said, "What the hell are
you doing bringing him over here?" R. 226:332.
Mele's Testimony.
Mele began the evening drinking with her family at the Kearns house. R. 226:335.
She had drunk more than ten beers and was intoxicated when she left in Patty's car at
about 2:00 a.m. R. 226:336. She subsequently drank two or three more beers and a drink
that contained "probably eight" ounces of hard liquor. R. 226:340-41, 394-95. She left
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the party to meet Toki, but she hid this from her family. R. 226:337, 428. She had met
Toki on two prior occasions and was drunk both times. R. 226:337-38, 396. Over
defense objection, Mele testified that Myla had introduced Toki as a member of the
Tongan Crip Gang (T.C.G.). R. 226:436.
Mele and Toki met at a party then left and Mele drove for about twenty minutes;
she could not really remember where they were because she had consumed thirteen to
fifteen beers and a cocktail containing eight ounces of liquor. R. 226:341, 399. They
parked, removed their clothing, and began having sex. R. 226:342. They stopped having
sex because Mele's family arrived. R.226:342. Magic opened the car door as Toki was
pulling up his pants; Mele was still naked. R. 226:342. Mele did not see what happened
but she heard Myla, Camilla, Magic, and Toki yelling and swearing. R. 226:343-44.
Mele did not speak to her family members. R. 226:345. She and Toki got dressed, and
she noticed a scratch under his eye. R. 226:345.
Mele heard Toki call Myla to ask if he could go to her house to apologize. R.
226:346, 411. She could tell that Myla was yelling and that she kept hanging up on Toki.
R. 226:346. Toki told Mele he wanted to apologize and asked her to drive to Glendale
"to get some of his boys" "just in case [Mele's] family jumped him or just in case
anything happened." R. 226:347-48. She drove to a house in Glendale but did not
remember where it was, and someone got in the backseat and talked to Toki in Tongan.
R.226:349. Mele was not quite sure what happened next, but the person who was in her
car ended up with a second person in another car. R. 226:405. Mele said she had met
these two individuals at a party a couple of weeks earlier and knew them as "D-Locc"
0

and "D-Down" but did not know which was which. R. 226:354. Mele said Toki told her
the two would follow them. R. 226:356. Mele thought Toki continued to talk with her
Aunt My la as they drove, and the other two followed in a silver car. R. 226:359-60.
Mele testified that after they pulled into the driveway of the Kearns house, Toki
got out of the car and started talking to Myla. R. 226:360. The silver car was not there.
R. 226:360. Toki kept telling Myla he wanted to apologize to Magic and did not want to
hurt her. R. 226:361-62. Myla responded by telling Toki he was stupid and to leave. R.
226:362. Shortly thereafter, the other car parked across the street. R. 226:360, 363.
Mele testified that at this point, Toki pulled out a shotgun, which she had not noticed
before, and walked toward the tarp with Myla in front of him, walking backwards, and
saying, "what the fuck are you doing?" R. 226:362-63, 365. At the same time, two
people got out of the other car. R. 226:364. Toki did not approach or speak to these two
people and instead talked to Myla, "the whole time." R. 226:421-22. Mele later
identified these two people as "D-Down and D-Locc" and picked them out of police
photographs. R.226:392, 415
Mele did not see Toki fire the gun but thought he did because there was a hole in
the tarp that she had not seen before. R. 226:421. She did see the other two shooting at
her house - one with a shotgun and the other with a handgun. R. R. 226:366-67. The
two shooters had blue bandanas on their faces and were only showing their eyes. R.
226:367, 429. After the shots were fired, Toki ran back to the silver car; Mele thought he
fired another shot toward the house while running. R. 226:368-69, 434. Toki opened the
passenger door, which hit Mele and she fell to the ground. R. 226: 369. The three took
in

off, leaving Mele on the ground. R. 226:369. Mele's Aunt Myla came over, called Mele
stupid, and punched her in the face, giving her a bloody nose. R. 226:37-71. Mele
pretended she was knocked out so she did not have to talk to police when they arrived.
R, 226:371. The ambulance then took her to the hospital. R. 226:372.
At the hospital, Mele lied to the officer who questioned her, telling the officer that
that she had been raped. R. 226:388. She also lied to Myla about being raped and to
another officer. R. 226:390-91. At trial, she admitted that she had lied about being raped,
but that she "thought that it would be easier on my part with my family, the relationship
with my family, I thought it would make it easier for me . . . . " R. 226:389. Although the
sexual encounter with Toki was consensual, Mele said that she did not have a romantic
interest in him and had sex with him only because she was drunk. R, 226:394, 398.
Detective Merino's Testimony.
Detective Break Merino, who is a member of the Salt Lake City gang
investigations unit, testified as a gang expert over Toki's objection. R. 226:521, 523.
Merino defined a gang as "two or more people acting in concert... for the furtherance of
a group or organization of a gang," and repeatedly emphasized that when discussing gang
activity, especially gang activity by the T.C.G., he meant criminal activity. R. 226:523,
524, 554. Merino testified that gang members usually use a different name or gang
moniker that is unique to that individual and sticks with them until they die or leave the
gang. R. 226:525. He testified about names used in the T.C.G., the gang's structure, the
use of bandanas or "C rags," and what he depicted as common gang signs. R. 226:526,
528-29. He indicated that Toki was a member of the T.C.G. and used the gang moniker
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Toc-Locc. R, 526:527. He said he knew this because other gang members had told him
and also because a member of the T.C.G. could be identified by tattoos on his head and
arms. R. 226:528. He also said that Daniel Maumau and David Kamoto used the names
D-Locc and D-Down and that Kamoto was a member of the T.C.G. R. 226:528-30.
Detective Merino did not testify, however, that Toki knew the co-defendants or had spent
time with them. R. 226:518-31.
Merino also testified that he "continuously" saw T.C.G. activity and discussed
criminal activity and the use of guns by T.C.G. members. R. 226:550. He talked about
the "gang problem," the gang suppression and investigation units he worked on, and his
investigation of gang crimes. R. 226:520-21.
Defense Alibi Witnesses.
Two alibi witnesses testified that Toki was at a party in Sugarhouse on February 3,
2007, the date of this incident, from 1:30 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. R. 227:571-72, 584. The
party was a birthday party for Sione M'au, and both witnesses were certain Toki was
present until about 7:00 a.m. R. 226: 571-72, 588.
Brawl Outside Courtroom.
During the state's case, the court took a recess while Mele was testifying; during
that recess, an altercation broke out in the hallway. R. 226:373-74. The fight did not
involve witnesses or parties, but did involve "a big group of Polynesians" and included
hitting, yelling, screaming, loud impacts, a big crash, and possibly someone shouting
"Mele." R. 226:375, 378. Defense counsel were concerned that jurors might have heard
the fighting as they left the bathroom, or heard conversations in the cafeteria about the
12

fight "[i]n Skanchy's courtroom." R. 226:376-77. Toki's lawyer asked that the judge
question the jurors to "find out if they've been prejudiced." R. 226:377. After discussion
as to whether the courtroom should be cleared while jurors were being questioned,
Kamoto's lawyer suggested that the jurors simply be instructed that that if they heard an
altercation, that altercation did not involve witnesses. R. 226:384.
Although Toki's lawyer objected to this approach, the judge decided to instruct the
jurors as Kamoto's attorney had suggested, and also excluded any observer under the age
of thirty, other than the alleged victims, from the courtroom. R. 226:385. Before Mele
resumed her testimony, the judge instructed the jurors as follows:
Let me, before we resume with our next witness or with our witness who is
in the process of providing testimony, indicate to our jury that we had an
altercation in the hallway outside of our courtroom over lunch recess. I don't
know if any of you overheard it or not, it didn't involve any of the witnesses or the
parties in this particular case. And I wanted to advise you of that and simply let
you know that it didn't involve people who are central, in terms of this case.
R. 226:386.
Informing Jury of Possession of a Weapon by a Restricted Person Charge.
Toki asked to sever the Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person
Charge from the other counts. R. 53. Rather than completely bifurcating the Restricted
Person charge from the other counts, the judge included an elements instruction that told
the jury that in order to find Toki guilty "of the offense of Possession of Dangerous
Weapon," it must find that he intentionally or knowingly possessed a firearm; this
instruction omitted the restricted person element. R. 153.
The judge recognized that the jury could not be informed that Toki was charged
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with being a restricted person, but then made a mistake and gave that information to the
jury injury instructions on several occasions. R. 225:20, 124, 125, 133, 134.
During deliberations, the jury sent out a note asking:
—We need clarification on "restricted person."
—Instruction 38 states Toki must be shown to have in possession, custody, or
control a "firearm"
-Why is that illegal until used for a crime?
- I f found guilty of count I does that make count II apply?
R. 107A. The court responded that the jurors should not concern themselves with the
"restricted person" language. R. 108; 227:668.
Motion for New Trial.
Following sentencing, Toki filed a motion for new trial. That motion outlined
several grounds for a new trial including Detective Merino's testimony regarding Toki's
membership in a criminal gang and the failure to question the jurors regarding their
knowledge of the brawl outside the courtroom. R. 169-79. The trial court denied the
motion. R. 208.
The Verdict.
The jury found Toki guilty of discharging a firearm from a vehicle near a highway
or in the direction of any person, building or vehicle with an in concert enhancement and
possession of a dangerous weapon. R. 167. It acquitted him of the aggravated assault
charge, but convicted him of a lesser charge of threatening with a dangerous weapon. R.
167.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's error in informing the jury at least three times that Toki was
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charged with being a restricted person requires a new trial. Although the court had
agreed that this information should not be conveyed to the jury, it nevertheless informed
the jury of the prejudicial restricted person charge on several occasions. By informing
the jury that Toki was charged with being a restricted person in possession of a dangerous
weapon, the trial court deprived Toki of a fair trial, in violation of due process.
The trial court also committed reversible error in failing to question the jurors to
detect bias after a brawl between Pacific Islanders took place outside the courtroom. The
altercation took place during the lunch recess and the parties thought some of the jurors
may have heard it or been aware of it because the matter was later discussed in the
cafeteria. In this case, where the state put on evidence indicating that Toki and his codefendants were members of a dangerous gang that was involved in criminal activity,
questioning the jurors was necessary to ensure a fair trial. The cautionary instruction
given by the trial court failed to alleviate the taint and instead informed the jury that a
brawl had taken place and suggested that the altercation was related to the case.
Testimony from a "gang expert" was irrelevant to the issues being decided by the
jury and its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any arguably minimal probative
value. The extensive testimony about the criminal activity, organization, dress, and
tattoos of members of the T.C.G. was not relevant to the jury question of whether Toki
acted in concert with two others. The state had no evidence that the crime was gang
related and instead presented evidence suggesting that the shots were fired in response to
Magic's treatment of Toki after he found Toki having sex with his sister. Additionally,
the state had other evidence to support its in concert claim. Moreover, the testimony was
1^

unduly prejudicial, and the prejudice caused by extensive testimony about criminal
activity by the T.C.G. along with testimony that Toki was a member of that gang
substantially outweighed any minimal probative value of the testimony. Admission of
this testimony therefore violated the rules of evidence and Toki's right to a fair trial.
The cumulative effect of these errors requires a new trial. The errors worked
together to depict Toki as a violent member of a street gang involved in criminal activity
and tainted the jury's ability to fairly assess the relevant evidence. The error in informing
the jury that Toki was charged with being a restricted person improperly informed the
jury of this prejudicial charge. This error worked with the irrelevant and prejudicial gang
testimony and information about the brawl to allow the jury to improperly base its
decision on concerns about gang violence and improper character evidence rather than
the relevant evidence in the case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
INFORMING THE JURY THAT TOKI HAD BEEN CHARGED AS BEING A
RESTRICTED PERSON IN POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON
The trial court committed reversible error in repeatedly informing the jury that
Toki was charged with being a restricted person. Although the state and judge both
recognized the prejudicial impact of this type of information, the allegations nevertheless
were read to the jury on several occasions. The prejudicial impact of this information
was heightened by the fact that the judge bifurcated the restricted person charge, asking
the jury to determine only whether Toki possessed a firearm. The jury's question as to
why possession of a firearm was illegal demonstrates that the procedure raised improper

speculation as to why Toki could not possess a firearm. The prejudicial procedure
requires reversal.
A. Repeatedly Informing the Jury that Toki was Charged with Being a Restricted
Person Deprived Toki of His Due Process Right to a Fair Trial
Although the trial court apparently recognized the prejudicial impact of informing
the jury that Toki was charged with being a restricted person, the court nevertheless
informed the jury of the prejudicial restricted person charge. R. 225:20. During the
preliminary instructions, the court stated that Toki was charged with "purchase, transfer,
possession or use of a firearm by a restricted person." R. 225:20. The court also
referred to Toki as a restricted person twice during the preliminary instructions. R.
225:124, 125. By informing the jury that Toki was charged with being a restricted person
in possession of a weapon, the trial court violated Toki's due process right to a fair trial,
requiring reversal. See State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Utah 1985) (holding
that charge of possession of a weapon by a restricted person must be severed from
burglary and theft charges to prevent undue prejudice), abrogated on other grounds in
State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997).
While joinder of crimes that were part of the same criminal episode is ordinarily
allowed, counts must be severed where joinder prejudices the defendant. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-8a-l (2003). In fact, Utah Code Ann. §77-8a-l(4)(a) mandates that the trial
court order the severance of unduly prejudicial charges, stating:
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of the
offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial
together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts,
grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires.
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(4)(a) (emphasis added); see also Saunders, 699 P.2d 738.
In Saunders, the supreme court held that the failure to sever the offense of
possession of a firearm by a restricted person from the charges of burglary and theft was
unduly prejudicial, denying the defendant a fair trial. The Court reasoned that while the
defendant's status as a prison inmate was relevant to the possession by a restricted person
charge, it was not relevant to the other charges, "except to show a criminal disposition as
a basis for an inference that he was guilty." Id. at 741. Due to "the tendency of a fact
finder to convict the accused because of bad character rather than because he is shown to
be guilty," "such evidence is presumed prejudicial[.]" IcL The error was prejudicial,
requiring a new trial because "the effect of the joinder here was to permit the
consideration of prejudicial evidence as to charges on which the evidence would have
been inadmissible in a separate trial." Id at 742.
The state charged Toki with discharge of a firearm with an "in concert"
enhancement and aggravated assault in addition to possession of a weapon by a restricted
person. As was the case in Saunders, Toki moved to sever the possession of a firearm by
a restricted person charge from the other counts because the jurors' knowledge of his
prior felony conviction would make it more likely that they would find Toki guilty of the
other charges. R. 53. Recognizing the prejudicial effect of the restricted person charge,
the state agreed to bifurcating the restricted person charge, but suggested that it be
submitted to the jury on a special verdict form asking the jury to find only whether Toki
possessed a gun, but not mentioning the restricted person element. R. 222:6.
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Instead of discussing only the possession portion of the charge, however, the trial
court read each of the charges to the jury, including the charge that Toki was a restricted
person. R. 225:20, 124, 125. On at least three occasions before the jury heard any
evidence, the judge told the jurors that Toki had been charged as a restricted person. R.
225:20, 124, 125. In fact, at the outset, when initially familiarizing the venire with the
case, the judge told all potential jurors that Toki was charged with being a restricted
person. R. 225:20. After the jury was selected, as part of the preliminary instructions,
the judge twice informed the jurors that Toki had been charged as a restricted person in
possession of a firearm. R. 225:124, 125. By reiterating this prejudicial information
three times, the judge ensured that the jury heard and digested the improper information.
Moreover, from the beginning of this trial, before the state presented any evidence, the
jury was aware that Toki was accused of being a restricted person.
After the evidence was presented, the judge again informed the jury at least twice
that Toki had been charged with being a restricted person. R. 133, 134. After closing
arguments, the parties alerted the judge that any reference to the restricted person charge
needed to be removed from the jury instructions. R. 227: 663-64. The judge agreed to
make the change before submitting the instructions to the jury, but neglected to delete the
prejudicial language from the jury instruction outlining the charges. Hence, although the
elements instruction and verdict form did not contain the restricted person element or
language (R. 112, 153), Instruction Number 5, which outlined "THE CHARGE(S) and
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE" told the jury in two separate places that Toki
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was charged with "Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm by a Restricted
Person" R. 133, 134.
In fact, while the verdict form asked only whether the jury found Toki guilty of
"Purchase, Transfer, Possession or Use of a Firearm," Jury Instruction Number 5
informed the jury that Toki was actually charged with being a restricted person while
possessing a firearm. R. 112, 153. This confused the jury, prompting them to write a
question to the court asking for "clarification on 'restricted person."5 R. 108; 227:668.
-We need clarification on "restricted person."
-Instruction 38 states Toki must be shown to have in possession, custody or
control a "firearm"
- Why is that illegal until used for a crime?
-If found guilty of count I does that make count II apply?
R. 108: 227:668. The court responded by telling the jurors not to concern themselves
with the "restricted person" language, thereby reemphasizing the restricted person
accusation. R. 108; 227:668. Hence, this procedure of bifurcating the possession by a
restricted person charge and outlining elements that did not amount to a crime further
enhanced the prejudicial impact of the restricted person information since it caused the
jury to question and speculate as to why it needed to find whether Toki possessed a gun
when possession is not illegal. The logical assumption for the jury under these
circumstances was that it was illegal for Toki to possess a gun because he was a restricted
person.
As was the case in Saunders, the jury heard information that was relevant to the
possession of a firearm by a restricted person charge, but which was irrelevant and
prejudicial to the other charges. Before the jury heard any evidence, it knew that Toki
on

was charged with being a restricted person. Its view was therefore tainted from the start.
That prejudicial information was reinforced by repetition then further heightened after the
evidence was presented by again twice referring to the restricted person charge. The
court's attempt at deflecting the jury's attention actually magnified the problem by letting
the jury know that another element existed but that they should not concern themselves
with that element, thereby suggesting that Toki was a restricted person. And, as the jury
recognized, possession of a firearm, by itself, is not a crime and proof of discharge of a
firearm necessarily created proof of possession; these unanswered concerns left the jury
to speculate that Toki could not possess a firearm because he was a restricted person. In
addition, having heard that Toki was a member of a dangerous gang that used guns and
was involved in criminal activity, the jury necessarily would have speculated that he was
unable to possess a firearm because of a violent criminal past. Such information and
speculation precluded Toki from receiving a fair trial, in violation of due process.
Although the trial court apparently recognized the prejudicial impact of the
restricted person charge, its attempts to preclude the jury from hearing that information
failed. Like Saunders, "the effect of joinder . . . was to permit the consideration of
prejudicial evidence as to charges on which the evidence would have been inadmissible
in a separate trial." Id In this case, where the state's case was built on testimony from
angry family members who presented inconsistent testimony and who had reason to
exaggerate or lie, this due process violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The repeated discussion of Toki's status as a restricted person therefore requires reversal
just as it did in Saunders.

B. The Trial Court's Error in Informing the Jury that Toki was a Restricted Person
Requires Reversal
Defense counsel preserved this issue for review by asking the trial court to sever
the restricted person charge from the other charges and by later requesting that the jury
not be informed of the restricted person charge. R. 227:664-64; 53. Moreover, even if
counsel did not preserve this error, the conviction can be reversed under the plain error
standard.
1. This Issue was Preserved by the Motion to Sever and the Request that the
Court not Inform the Jury of the Allegation that Toki was a Restricted Person
Toki preserved this issue for review by (1) moving to sever the restricted person
charge from the other charges (R. 53) and (2) alerting the court that it needed to remove
any reference to the restricted person charge. R. 227:663-64. The motion and objection
served the first purpose of the preservation rule by giving the trial court the opportunity
to address and correct the error. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^11,10 P.3d 346
(indicating one purpose of preservation rule is to afford the trial court the opportunity to
address and correct an error). The motion and objection also met the second purpose of
the preservation rule since defense counsel did not choose to "forego making the
objection with the strategy of enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and then,
if the strategy fail[ed],.. . claiming] on appeal that the Court should reverse." Id.
(quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original). Moreover, although counsel
for Kamoto initially alerted the court of the need to remove the restricted person language
(R. 227:663-64), Toki's lawyer implicitly joined in that request and in the context of the
hearing, there was nothing further that could be done to alert the judge.

An issue is preserved where it is "'raised to a level of consciousness such that the
trial judge can consider it.'" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
(citation omitted). In this case, where the judge was aware of the claim and alerted on
more than one occasion, the issue was adequately preserved for review.
The error was prejudicial just as it was in Saunders. The jury was made aware that
Toki was charged with being a restricted person. R. 226:20, 124, 125, 133, 134. This
information was emphasized by the jury instruction asking the jury to determine whether
Toki possessed a firearm, behavior that is not a crime. R. 107A, 112. The jury's note
leaves no doubt that it was alerted to this improper information. R. 107A. This case
presented a credibility issue for the jury since the state's case was based on the testimony
of inebriated and angry family members who had found Toki having sex with Mele. In
fact, the jury did not find that Toki had committed an aggravated assault, presumably
because they did not believe at least some of the testimony. Under these circumstances,
like Saunders, the verdict should be overturned.
2. Even if the Issue Were not Preserved, the Verdict Should be Overturned Under
the Plain Error Doctrine
The plain error doctrine allows appellate review of this issue regardless of whether
the issue was preserved. The purpose of the plain error doctrine is to permit an appellate
court "to avoid injustice." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^f 13. Plain error occurs where "c(i) an
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant.'" Id. (citation omitted).
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As outlined above, an error occurred when the trial court repeatedly informed the
jury that Toki was being charged as a restricted person. As the state and trial court
seemed to recognize, this type of information taints a jury's ability to make a fair and
impartial decision on other charges. See Saunders, 699 P.2d at 741-42. Because of the
due process violation that occurs when a jury is informed that the defendant is a restricted
person, it was error to give the jury this information. Id. And, in light of the fact that
Saunders has precluded this type of information from going to the jury for over twenty
years, the error was obvious. Indeed, the readiness with which the state and the judge
agreed to keep this information from the jury underscores the obviousness of this error.
This obvious error requires reversal because it was prejudicial. Although
testimony implicated Toki, the credibility of that testimony was undermined by the
animosity the witnesses had towards Toki, and their level of intoxication during the
incident. In fact, the jury acquitted Toki of the assault charge even though testimony
arguably supported it. Because the witnesses had hostility toward Toki and offered
inconsistent details about the incident, information that Toki was charged with being a
restricted person necessarily tainted their deliberations. As was the case in Saunders,
this information was prejudicial, requiring a new trial.
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO QUESTION JURORS
TO DETECT JUROR BIAS REGARDING A BRAWL THAT OCCURRED IN
THE HALL BESIDE THE COURTROOM
Although a brawl took place outside the courtroom and could have been heard or
witnessed by jurors, the judge refused to question the jurors and instead gave a remedial
instruction. That instruction was not sufficient to ensure that jurors were not prejudiced

by this incident. Because the potential for prejudice was significant, Toki's right to a fair
trial was undermined, and the court abused its discretion in failing to question the juror.
"The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). Courts therefore "must be
alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process" and must
ensure that no "unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play."
Id. at 503, 505. This means that "[cjourts must do the best they can to evaluate the likely
effects of a particular procedure, based on reason, principle, and common human
experience." Id. at 504.
Although cautionary instructions or remedial statements may be sufficient to
alleviate prejudice in some circumstances, the corrective measure of engaging in
individual voir dire to detect bias is also necessary in order to ensure that a defendant
receives a fair trial. See United States v. Mannie, 509 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2007).
Moreover, while "in the vast majority of cases, the trial judge can cure bias that may
develop in jurors' minds by issuing cautionary instructions and conducting voir dire"
there are circumstances where "no amount of voir dire and cautionary instructions can
remedy the defect." LI Circumstances that give rise to unfair prejudice are those where
"an episode is deemed inherently prejudicial if 'an unacceptable risk is presented of
impermissible factors coming into play.'" Id. (further citations omitted). "The toxic
nature of the potential prejudice in such cases is so inherent to the misconduct that 'little
stock need be placed in jurors' claims to the contrary.'" Id. at 856-57 (further citation
omitted).

Disruptive activity during a trial can be a circumstance that requires a mistrial
even when the trial court has been "judicious in its use of voir dire and cautionary
instructions." Id. at 857. In Mannie, the Seventh Circuit held that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial where incidents involving gang signs and
intimidating behavior by gang members occurred during the trial. Id. In that case, a juror
saw gang members making gang signs and some jurors thought gang members were
trying to memorize their faces or stare them down. Id Other factors contributing to the
unfairness of the trial were "a violent courtroom brawl" and the appearance of the codefendant in prison clothes. Id, Although the trial judge extensively voir dired the jury
about these events and used cautionary instructions, these circumstances "amounted] to
prejudice," especially since "the government's theory of the case was that [the
defendants] were dangerous members of a street gang." Id. The court concluded that
"there was an impermissible risk that some jurors voted to convict based on the
perception that Mannie was a violent gangster who needed to be incarcerated for the
safety of the community." Id
As was the case in Mannie, the circumstances here require a new trial. The state
charged Toki with discharge of a firearm with a group enhancement, possession of a
firearm by a restricted person, and aggravated assault. R. 5-7. In an effort to prove the
group enhancement, the state brought in a gang expert to testify that Toki and his codefendants were members of a criminal gang, the T.C.G. R. 523. Here, as in Mannie, the
state's theory was that Toki and co-defendant Kamoto were "dangerous members of a
street gang." Id. at 856.
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Also like Mannie, disruptive events occurred during the trial that impacted on the
jurors' impartiality. In a recess taken during Mele's testimony, a "melee" took place in
the hallway outside the courtroom. R. 373. The prosecutor noted that some of the jurors
were coming out of the bathroom at the time "and may have been aware that there was
something going on." R. 374. Defense lawyers noted that the fight was loud and some of
the jurors "would have heard it." R. 374-75. Counsel for Kamoto heard someone shout
Mele's name. R. 375. l There was a big crash and the sounds of hitting, yelling, and
screaming; it sounded like a fight. R. 375.
Word spread quickly about the fight and counsel for Toki and Kamoto heard
people in the cafeteria discussing the brawl "in Skanchy's courtroom." R. 376. Toki's
lawyer thought he saw some of the jurors in the cafeteria, but was not sure whether they
had heard the discussion. R. 377.
As was the case in Manme, Toki's lawyer expressed concern, stating "it's an
aggravated assault case, Polynesians who have assaulted police officers and this is a case
about gang members, so I definitely think it's relevant to each other and it could
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The Deseret News reported that the adult brother of co-defendant Kamoto was arrested
for his role in the brawl and charged with "felony witness tampering, five counts of
assault on a police officer and interfering with an arrest." Pat Reavy, 2 Arrested in
Courthouse Fight, DESERET NEWS, October 4, 2008, available at
http://www.deseretnewsxoin/article/700263902/2-arrested-in-courthouse-fight.html.
Another teenager "fought with bailiffs and eventually had to be Tasered before he was
taken into custody . . . ." IdL According to the Deseret News, "[d]uring a break in
testimony [ ], an argument started between a witness who had just taken the stand and a
person sitting in the gallery. The argument continued in the hallway outside Judge
Randall Skanchy's courtroom . . . ."Id. "Members of the gang unit intervened and a
fight resulted, sending one deputy to the hospital." Id.
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prejudice them to think about gang bangers, really violent and that what they're accusing
them of doing is true." R. 226:380. The trial court initially decided to conduct an in
camera review of all of the jurors. R. 226:381. The state and Toki's lawyer concurred in
that approach. R. 381-82. The court also suggested clearing the courtroom, but all of
the parties thought that "would definitely cause the jurors to question." R. 226:382-83.
Based on the prosecutor's suggestion, the court then decided to exclude younger males
and females. R. 226:383-84.
Counsel for Kamoto suggested that instead of conducting individual voir dire, the
court give a remedial instruction. R. 226:384. Although the prosecutor agreed with this
suggestion, counsel for Toki objected. R. 226:385. Nevertheless, the court decided not
to question the jurors to determine whether they had been tainted by the brawl, and
instead instructed them as follows:
Let me, before we resume with our next witness or with our witness who is in the
process of providing testimony, indicate to our jury that we had an altercation in
the hallway outside of our courtroom over the lunch recess. I don't know if any of
you overheard it or not, it didn't involve any of the witnesses or the parties in this
particular case. And I wanted to advise you of that and simply let you know that it
didn't involve people who are central, in terms of this case.
R. 226:386.
Rather than alleviating any taint caused by the altercation, this instruction
heightened the possibility that jurors would be impacted by the brawl and believe that
Toki was the member of a violent gang. Indeed, the instruction informed any jurors who
were not aware of the fight, that "an altercation [had occurred] outside of our courtroom
over the lunch recess." R. 226:386. The instruction also did not alleviate any concern

about gang activity because while the fight did not involve the defendants, the instruction
suggested that others felt strongly enough about this case to engage in a brawl outside the
courtroom, thereby planting the idea of gang members aligned with either the defendants
or the witnesses carrying the dispute in the courtroom out into the hallway. Moreover, by
indicating that the brawl "didn't involve people who are central, in terms of this case" the
court suggested that people who were not "central" but somehow connected to the case
had been involved in the fight. And, because the meaning of "people who are central, in
terms of the case" is not clear, the jury was left to speculate whether witnesses or people
in the courtroom or both were involved in the fight. Finally, by clearing the courtroom of
all people under the age of thirty (R. 226:385), the trial court sent a clear message,
through the instruction and clearing of the courtroom, that a significant altercation related
to the case had occurred.
The potential for prejudice caused by these circumstances requires a new trial.
The prosecution presented evidence that Toki was in a dangerous and criminal street
gang. As was the case in Mannie, there is a high likelihood that jurors convicted Toki
based on the prejudice caused by this incident. But unlike Mannie, the trial court failed
to even question the jurors, thereby failing to detect or correct juror bias. Adding to the
prejudice, the court called attention to the allegation that Toki was a restricted person, as
outline in Point I, and also allowed a police officer to testify as a gang expert; that
testimony provided irrelevant and prejudicial information about gang activities. See
Point II. Under these circumstances, the brawl combined with the failure to voir dire the
jurors as to the impact of the brawl on their ability to be fair, requires a new trial.
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Because there is "an unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible factors coming into play/'
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 505, the district court abused its discretion when it refused to conduct
individual voir dire of the jurors, requiring reversal.
POINT HI. TESTIMONY FROM A "GANG EXPERT" WAS NOT RELEVANT
TO THE ISSUES BEING DECIDED BY THE JURY AND WAS UNDULY
PREJUDICIAL
Detective Merino's extensive testimony regarding the T.C.G., its operations,
criminal activity, and Toki's membership had no probative value in establishing the
crimes charged or that the co-defendants acted in concert. The evidence was merely
cumulative of other evidence showing that the crime was carried out by three people and
did not include any evidence showing that the three knew each other. In addition, any
minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial impact of this
testimony regarding use of guns and criminal activity. Because the erroneous admission
of this testimony affected the outcome, a new trial is required.
2

Although Toki preserved this issue by objecting to the procedure, he did not ask for a
mistrial based on the taint. Nevertheless, the objection alerted the court to the claim and
gave the court an opportunity to rule, thereby preserving the issue. See Holgate, 2000 UT
74, ^fl 1 (indicating that the purpose of the preservation rule is to give trial courts the
opportunity to address a claimed error and correct it if appropriate and also to preclude a
defendant from purposely foregoing an objection). This issue was "'raised to a level of
consciousness such that the trial judge [could] consider it.'" Brown, 856 P.2d at 361
(citation omitted). It therefore was preserved. Moreover, even if the issue were not
preserved, it can be reviewed for plain error. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09
(Utah 1993) (plain error doctrine requires reversal where "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful... .") The
error is failing to ensure that the jury was not biased by the incident was obvious; in fact,
the constitutional right to an unbiased jury is basic to our system. The error prejudiced
Toki because jurors were made aware of an altercation in the hallway which was related
in some way to the case, then the courtroom was cleared in this case where the state
emphasized Toki's involvement in a dangerous and violent street gang.
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"Evidence of gang related activity is only admissible where there is sufficient
proof that such activity is related to the crime charged." People v. Maldonado, No. 1-072406, 2010 WL 335608 at *15 (111. App. Ct. Jan. 28, 2010) (citing People v. Smith, 565
N.E.2d 900, 907 (111. 1990)); see also Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 166 (1992)
(holding that evidence of defendant's membership in Aryan Brotherhood prison gang had
no relevance to sentencing hearing in capital homicide case where membership was not
tied to the murder);State v. Pedockie, 2008 UT App 417, 2008 WL 4899186, at * l-*2
(unpublished) (assessing whether evidence of gang membership, along with other bad
acts evidence, was relevant for a proper, non-character purpose); Utah R. Evid. 401, 402,
404. Moreover, even if evidence of gang membership is tied to the crime charged, the
evidence can be so prejudicial that any probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial
effect, requiring that it not be admitted. People v. Cardenas, 647 P.2d 569, 572-73 (Cal.
1982); see also Utah R. Evid. 403.
The court held in Maldonado that evidence and argument that went beyond the
limited evidence of gang membership was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial where the
state did not have proof that the crime was gang related. Maldonado, 2010 WL 335608 at
* 16. While the court acknowledged that limited evidence of gang membership might be
relevant for the purpose of establishing why witnesses might have changed their
testimony, it was not admissible to suggest motive or "that [the] defendant committed
the murder because he is a gang member," where there was no evidence supporting this
claim. Id. at * 15. Because "[t]he only effect of these statements was to 'inflame the
passion or arouse the prejudice of the jury against the defendant, without throwing any
^1

light on the question for decision,5" the trial court erred in admitting it. Id. at * 16.
Moreover, "evidence that suggested the shooting was gang-related could have affected
the outcome," requiring a new trial. Id.
Even when evidence regarding gang membership has some probative value to the
issues being decided by the jury, admission of that evidence can nevertheless be so
prejudicial that the probative value is outweighed in violation of Rule 403. Id.; see also
Cardenas, 647 P.2d at 572-73. In Cardenas, the California Supreme Court
acknowledged that evidence of gang membership may have some probative value in that
case in "establishing] possible bias of the defense witnesses in favor of appellant."
Cardenas, 647 P.2d at 572. But the evidence was of minimal probative value and
cumulative since other evidence showed "that appellant and his male witnesses were
neighborhood friends." Id. Moreover, the evidence "created a substantial danger of
undue prejudice" since "[t]here was a real danger that the jury would improperly infer
that appellant had a criminal disposition because (1) the El Monte Flores was a youth
gang; (2) such gangs commit criminal acts; and (3) appellant was a member of the Flores
gang." Id Because the minimal probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its
substantial prejudice, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.
The trial court likewise erred in admitting the testimony in this case because it was
not probative of the issues being decided by the jury, and even if it were, the testimony
went beyond information that was relevant to the case and substantially prejudiced Toki.
After defense counsel objected to Detective Merino's testimony based on lack of
relevance and Rule 403 grounds (R. 225:9-10, 13-14; 226:523), the state suggested two
70

possible purposes for the admission of the gang evidence. R. 225:11-12. First, because
Toki's co-defendant, Kamoto, was only identified to police by his gang moniker, "DDown," Detective Merino would testify that "D-Down" and Kamoto were in fact the
same person. R. 225:11-12. Second, with regard to Toki, the alleged purpose of
Detective Merino's testimony was to show that Toki, Kamoto, and Maumau were acting
in concert. R. 225:12, 15. The state argued their common membership in the T.C.G. was
relevant to this element of the group enhancement because "they were all wearing blue
bandanas," and, just like the state argued in Cardenas, "they know each other,... they
hang out together,. . . [and] they've been in photographs together." R. 225:12, 15.
Although counsel for Toki countered that his client was not identified by a gang moniker,
the jury was not being asked to determine gang membership, and the testimony was
highly prejudicial (R. 225:13-14), the trial court nevertheless allowed the testimony. R.
225:16.
Contrary to the state's argument, the testimony was not needed to establish that the
perpetrators acted in concert. In fact, the testimony regarding the incident and the role of
the three individuals, if believed, supported the state's claim that the three acted in
concert and evidence of gang membership added nothing to the issue being decided by
the jury. If the jury believed the state's witnesses, they would have believed that Toki
knew the other participants, had conversed with them right before the incident, had
driven to the scene at about the same time, and had participated in the incident with them.
And, Merino did not offer photographs or testify that the three knew each other; since the
T.C.G. is a large, nationwide gang, identifying three people as members without

establishing that they knew each other had no probative value. The issue of whether
Toki and the co-defendants were members of a criminal street gang was not before the
jury, and Merino's testimony added nothing to the question of whether the three acted in
concert. Instead, the testimony injected prejudicial and irrelevant information about gang
criminal activities and membership which had no bearing on the issues being decided.
Moreover, any minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the
prejudicial impact this extensive testimony regarding criminal activity by the T.C.G. The
testimony exceeded the inadmissible testimony in Cardenas and went far beyond the
purposes outlined by the state. Detective Merino made it clear that when he was
discussing gang activity, specifically T.C.G. gang activity, he meant criminal activity,
and people hanging out together are not considered a gang unless they are doing criminal
activity. R. 226:524, 553. He indicated that he "continuously" saw T.C.G. activity while
on patrol and discussed the use of guns and criminal activity by T.C.G. members. R.
226:520. He also talked about the gang suppression and gang investigation units he
worked on, where he "develop[ed] as much information on our gang problem as possible
and then investigate^] and solve[d] the crimes." R. 226:521.
After making it clear that gangs are involved in criminal activity, Detective
Merino discussed additional information regarding gangs that was irrelevant to the jury's
decision but which emphasized the danger of gangs. He described gang clothing and
tattoos, identified Toki as a member of the T.C.G., described Toki's gang related tattoos
in detail, and identified Toki and the co-defendants by their gang monikers, thereby
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emphasizing that he believed Toki was involved in criminal activity as part of a gang. R.
226:525-31.
The explicit line of questioning about the T.C.G., its propensity for criminality,
and Toki's membership in a gang went beyond the hinting and intimation that the court
considered unduly prejudicial in Cardenas. In Cardenas, the court was concerned that the
jury might improperly infer, either through personal knowledge or "in-court observations
of the witnesses' age, ethnicity, and tattoos" that the gang was involved in criminal
activity. Cardenas, 647 P.2d at 572-73. Testimony elicited by the prosecutor that the
gang was involved in criminal activity was considered further error. Id at 573. Here, the
testimony went much further, explicitly stating that the gang was involved in criminal
activity and the use of guns, identifying Toki and the others as members of the T.C.G.,
and discussing the T.C.G.'s propensity for criminal activity. R. 226:519, 523, 527-30.
As was the case in Cardenas, Merino's testimony "made it a near certainty that the jury
viewed appellant as more likely to have committed the violent offenses [ ] because of his
[gang] membership." Cardenas, 647 P.2d at 573. Because the prejudicial impact
outweighed any minimal probative value, the trial court erred in allowing this testimony.
This error requires reversal. Toki presented alibi evidence indicating that he was
at a birthday party when this shooting occurred. R. 227:342-44, 388-91. In addition, the
credibility of the state's witnesses was suspect, as evidenced by the jury's verdict on the
aggravated assault count, Mele's acknowledged false claim that Toki raped her, the
highly intoxicated state of the witnesses, and the motive of Mele's relatives to lie after
finding Toki having sexual intercourse with her. Indeed, where the discovered sexual

liaison between Mele and Toki gave rise to intense anger by Mele's family members, the
jury easily could have believed that much of their testimony was manufactured.
Moreover, the impact of this improper testimony was heightened by the fact that the trial
judge cleared the courtroom of all people under the age of thirty, thereby giving the
impression that the court might have some sort of concern for gang activity. R. 226:386.
The weakness of the testimony from the state's witnesses coupled with the overwhelming
prejudice caused by Merino's testimony requires reversal since there is a reasonable
probability the improper testimony affected the outcome.3
POINT IV. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS REQUIRES A
NEW TRIAL
Regardless of whether an individual error requires reversal, the cumulative effect
of the errors in this case requires a new trial. The unfairly prejudicial testimony depicting
Toki as a member of the T.C.G., coupled with the error in telling the jury that Toki was
charged as being a restricted person and the jury's potential awareness of the brawl
worked together to undermine the fairness of this trial.
This court will reverse a conviction "if the cumulative effect of the several errors
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This issue was preserved by repeated objections below. R. 225:9-14; 226:523. Even if
it had not been preserved, however, it could be reviewed for plain error. See Dunn, 850
P.2d at 1208-09. The error was obvious under Rules 401, 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence and prejudicial as outlined above. Because relevance is a basic requirement
for any piece of evidence, the error in admitting evidence that was not relevant should
have been obvious to the trial court. And, given the objections and the overwhelming
prejudicial impact of evidence of criminal activity and use of guns, the error under Rule
403 should likewise have been obvious to the trial court. The prejudice caused by this
evidence, especially in light of the credibility issues, motive to lie and acknowledged
falsehoods requires a new trial.
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undermines [the court's] confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." State v. Havatone,
2008 UT App 133,^8, 183 P.3d 257 (further citation omitted). When determining the
combined prejudicial effect of the errors, this Court considers the evidence presented
against the defendant, any defense evidence, and the impact of multiple errors. Id
As previously outlined, the state's witnesses to the incident presented credibility
concerns for the jury. The intoxicated family members caught Toki having sexual
intercourse with Mele and were angry enough for a fight to erupt. R. 226:341-44. Under
those circumstances, they had a motive to manufacture a case against Toki. Moreover,
Toki presented evidence that he was not at the scene of the crime and instead was at a
party in Sugarhouse when the alleged shooting occurred. R. 227:571-72, 575, 587-88.
The jury had to decide whether to believe the alibi witnesses or the family members in
deciding whether to convict Toki.
The errors worked together to unfairly influence the jurors to convict. As was the
case in Havatone, the cumulative effect of the errors was to cause the jurors to disbelieve
Toki's defense, thereby prejudicing him. First, the erroneous admission of the extensive
gang testimony improperly informed the jury that Toki was a member of a dangerous and
criminal gang. The overwhelming prejudice caused by information that a defendant has
engaged in other dangerous, criminal conduct is well established. See Saunders, 699
P.2d at 741-42. In this case, the jury made its decision as to guilt knowing that Toki was
the member of a gang involved in dangerous and criminal activity.
The prejudice caused by this information was heightened by the error in informing
the jury that Toki was charged with being a restricted person. R. 134; 225:125. As
in

evidenced by the juror's note, the bifurcation of the charge and repeated recitation the
"restricted person" language caused the jury to wonder what other criminal activity was
attributable to Toki. R. 108; 227:668. The risk that the jurors might have known about
the brawl that occurred outside the courtroom and the failure to ascertain the extent of
their knowledge further enhanced the prejudicial impact of these errors. This is
especially so since the courtroom was cleared immediately after the brawl, further
signifying to the jury that some sort of concern for violence or criminal activity existed.
As in Havatone, improper evidence impugned the credibility of the defense. The
cumulative effect of the errors was even stronger here, however, because the errors
bolstered the state's case by including unfair character propensity evidence, suggesting
Toki was more likely to commit crimes, especially crimes involving guns, because he
was a restricted person and the member of a violent gang that used guns and committed
crimes. Because there is a substantial risk that the cumulative effect of the errors
impacted on the verdict, a new trial is required.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Sitamipa Toki respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _f\_ day of March, 2010.
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CHARGES
1. DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM VEH/HWY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/03/2008 Guilty
2. PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 10/03/2008 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM
VEH/HWY a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of PURCH/POSS DANGEROUS WEAPON
a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
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Date:
Nov 17, 2008
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Counts one and two are consecutive and this case is consecutive to
any other case.
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TOKI MIPA
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UTAH R.EVID. 401
RULE 401. DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE"
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

UTAH R. EVID. 402
RULE 402. RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other
rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

UTAH R. EVID. 403
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
UTAH R. EVID. 404
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character
is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(a)(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of the

alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2),
evidence of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(a)(2) Character of alleged victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor;
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules
607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good
cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
(c) Evidence of similar crimes in child molestation cases.
(c)(1) In a criminal case in which the accused is charged with child molestation, evidence
of the commission of other acts of child molestation may be admissible to prove a propensity to commit the crime charged provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at
trial.
(c)(2) For purposes of this rule "child molestation" means an act committed in relation to a
child under the age of 14 which would, if committed in this state, be a sexual offense or an
attempt to commit a sexual offense.
(c)(3) Rule 404(c) does not limit the admissibility of evidence otherwise admissible under
Rule 404(a), 404(b), or any other rule of evidence.
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U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV
Section 1.
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

